What Went Right and Wrong at Coventry?

Spurs make it into the 4th round of the league cup, but only just.

Ange Postecoglou made eight changes to the starting 11 on Wednesday to face Coventry away in Spurs’ first league cup action of the season. The performance was dreadful, but Spurs still managed to come away with a 2-1 victory, equalizing in the 88th minute and scoring the matchwinner in the 93rd minute. The performance raised a number of issues that merit discussion. So let’s go through them.

Was eight changes too many?

Not necessarily, but it did introduce problems.

Think back to the analogous tie against Fulham last season, which Spurs lost on penalties after fielding a side with a similar number and degree of changes. People are still angry about that choice, but I can see the manager’s rationale. Then, Postecoglou was feeling out his squad early in his first season and needed to establish a baseline for who he could and couldn’t trust. It was a gamble—one he ultimately lost—but not unreasonable given how few opportunities he would have in a season without European football to get a feel for what his best squad looks like in meaningful matchplay.

The situation this year is different, but also, I think, justifiable. With European football—in a new, lengthier format—plus the domestic cup competitions, Spurs are set to play at around 30% more football this season. Not only that, but Ange has made it clear that he expects to win something this season. To do that over the course of so many games across four competitions, winning something necessarily means rotating the squad and competing in meaningful matches without his ideal first 11, whatever that would look like. The purpose of rotating at this early opportunity, against a Championship-level side, is not only to get minutes into the legs of those players who haven’t had many yet this season, but, crucially, to get minutes in those players together.

As we saw from the performance—which was nothing less than atrocious—it’s not just about individual players and their ability, but how players get used to playing together, learning how to anticipate one another’s movements and choices, and figuring out how to coordinate themselves on and off the ball. We were poor foremost because we weren’t coordinated in defense or attack, because we fielded a side with no real match experience playing together.

Examples of this lack of coordination include Djed Spence waving his hand at Ben Davies to pick up the eventual Coventry goalscorer, who trotted right between the two Tottenham defenders for the breakthrough goal. With the ball we were even worse, midfielders unsure about who should drop deep to pick the ball up from Dragusin and Davies in buildup, and a front line lingering on the ball until dispossession because there were no runs to spot. Frequently we saw Sarr and Dragusin attempt long balls over the top because we had no buildup through the middle of the pitch, and sometimes just out of haste.

This is what explains the performance, I think. But the upside—surprisingly, there is one—is that the next time we have to entertain serious squad rotation, Postecoglou will have seen the issues and can address them, as can the players.

The real problem with Postecoglou’s selection yesterday wasn’t the sheer number of changes, but the combinations he used.

Why did the combination of players on the pitch work so poorly?

Once Odobert went down with an injury, we had a serious problem on the right side, with Johnson on the wing and Sarr in the right-sided 8 position. Both are what I’d call straight-line players. Whereas players such as Maddison and Kulusevski can twist and turn on the ball, creating deception that gives them room to change angle or direction, Johnson and Sarr are both direct. Johnson is a very good vertical winger, capable of running past defenders into space, but with the ball at his feet and a man in front of him, he’s not good at changing angles or beating his man. This is why so many of his attempted crosses and dribbles were just smashed at the defender in front of him, sometimes out for corner or a throw-in.

While Sarr can also move the ball laterally, again, he does so without deception. His long, fluid strides enable him to glide away from defenders, but not around them. When Sarr squares up to pass the ball, you know where it’s going. The combination of these attributes—which aren’t bad in and of themselves—makes us less dynamic and easier to contain on the right side. That in turn makes it easier to double up on Son (when he’s in the lineup) or wherever else we’re looking more dangerous.

Similarly, I think Dragusin and Davies don’t quite work as a center back pairing. For a while Udogie’s pace and physicality were enough to put Coventry’s attackers off the left side, or at least to recover when Davies drifted inward to make crucial interventions. But once Spence came on (bolstering the attack) he immediately passed the threat on his side along to Davies, and we conceded.

I’m a bit more worried about the Dragusin and Davies pairing in buildup, however, again especially without Udogie, because then Spurs lose either the elite carrying ability of van de Ven and the elite line-breaking passing of Romero, and can struggle to play out. When Bissouma isn’t in the team, the problem is even worse.

So, this is a snapshot of some combinations that I thought didn’t work, but they key point here is that our buildup doesn’t work if essentially all of the players who do fundamental (and extremely difficult and risky) things for us in buildup—Vicario’s distribution, Romero’s passing, van de Ven’s carrying, Udogie’s carrying, and Bissouma’s passing and carrying—are not on the pitch. If we’re going to replace both center backs, we need Bissouma on the pitch, especially if we’re also going to take Udogie off at halftime. If we’re going to have Forster in goal, we need much better build-up personnel around him to cover for his shortcomings with the ball at his feet.

Likewise, in attack, we can’t afford to sacrifice one side of the pitch so our opponents can focus their energy through the middle (as Arsenal did against us in the NLD) or on the other side to stop us where we’re most threatening. Spurs have to be threatening everywhere. That means, in practical terms, if Johnson is playing on the right wing, Kulusevski (then maybe Bentancur or Bergvall) needs to be in the right-sided 8 role. If Sarr is in the right-sided 8 role, Odobert or Kulusevski need to be on the right wing.

What changed the game?

In the final 10 minutes or so, Spurs came alive and were ultimately able to impose themselves on Coventry with two quick and convincing goals. What made the difference?

It shouldn’t be hard to guess. The introduction of Maddison and Kulusevski changed the game, because that’s what happens when you rely on quality. More precisely, their introduction freed up Bentancur to worry less about turning the ball over from deep, because suddenly he had two teammates running toward him who really, really wanted the ball. They also introduced quick passing and combination play through the middle that Coventry couldn’t live with. They didn’t always make the right decisions—I’m thinking of Maddison trying a low-percentage shot instead of laying off to his left for what would’ve been a much higher-percentage shot—but they menaced a tired defense and upped the tempo of possession at the right time (hell, at the only time left).

And last, but certainly not least, once the more dynamic midfield of Bentancur-Maddison-Kulusevski was in place, it freed up a struggling Brennan Johnson to do the thing he’s best at, rather than the thing he’s worst at. Johnson expertly spotted the space to run into, made the run, and when Bentancur put him through he was in his comfort zone, through on goal with plenty to do but always up for it.