What Happened in That Second Half against Brighton?

I'm puzzled by this one.

I’m writing this post to think through what happened with Spurs on Sunday in the second half against Brighton. Spurs went up 0-2 in the first half, exerting total control over the game. I even tweeted this part way through the first half…

…because it was true! Brighton were the only team in the league who arguably press as intensely as Spurs do, and one of two teams who play a higher defensive line than Spurs do. So whereas the match commentators on my USA network feed framed the match from the beginning as two high-risk, high-line, high-pressing, high-possession, idealistic sides battling it out without tactical concessions, I expected one of the two would impose themselves on the other and the match wouldn’t be as open as everyone thought.

Indeed, I was right. At least at first. Spurs forced Brighton back, kept them from playing out, dominated possession, dominated territory, and not only had Brighton on the ropes the whole first half, but also put two in the back of the net to show for it.

Comically, at that point, I had to go off to a work event and missed the second half (live, that is), so by the time I got free and checked the score I couldn’t believe it. It made no sense based on where I’d left off with the match.

So I’ve been trying—and struggling—to make sense of it.

I’ve heard the theories, but they’re not convincing.

Post-match frustration brought out a lot of theories as to what went wrong. I’ll address each one I came across:

1. Spurs are too open. The high line is too risky. I don’t see it. Every goal Brighton scored was scored with Spurs players in numbers behind the ball and with an opportunity to make a play on the ball. The first goal glances off van de Ven before Udogie takes a swing at a clearance and completely misses. The second goal happened in between two Spurs defenders who had to be creative to somehow *not* put a challenge in. And for the third goal, from a throw-in, Rutter somehow squirms through three Spurs defenders surrounding him, the ball bouncing out behind all three, at which point Bentancur actually beats Rutter to it on the byline but decides not to clear it out for a corner. Rutter’s cross to Wellbeck for the match winner pops out of Bentancur’s tackle and falls to Wellbeck’s head while Romero and Porro spectate. In other words, none of these goals happened in behind Spurs’ defense. They were all individual defensive lapses that Postecoglou can expect shouldn’t, and wouldn’t, ordinarily happen.

2. Postecoglou didn’t respond tactically. With the exception of subbing on Estupiñan, Hürzeler basically just doubled down on what they did in the first half. Spurs continued to have opportunities to push on in the second half, though things did open up. But they opened up, if anything, because it was Spurs who changed what they were doing. I don’t think it was intentional, however, to let off on the press and give Brighton more space to build.

3. Spurs didn’t slow down and put a foot on the ball and see out the game. This is an extension of item (2) above, a tactical tweak. But when I watched the game back, it was clear that Spurs actually did have spells in the second half where they slowed the game down, held possession and territory, and attempted to work their way back into the game. The momentum chart shows Spurs regaining territory after the first and third Brighton goals:

   

4. Postecoglou didn’t make substitutions early or often enough. I’m a little sympathetic to this line of thinking, but again I don’t think it holds up. It probably would’ve been a good idea to put Spence on for Udogie, who was having an awful game and is probably playing too much football already this season. But where I saw things really start to deteriorate for Spurs in the second half (when I watched it back) was with the press, starting with the front line. With Son, Richarlison, and Odobert available, I think we could’ve made front-line substitutions, kept the pressure on, and won that match. But with those injuries and only 17-year-old Mikey Moore to turn to, there weren’t obvious game-changing substitutions.

So, what actually happened?

I think part of why I’ve had so much difficulty assessing the second half of that match is because it made no sense in light of what came immediately before it. By ‘made no sense’ I mean nothing was happening in the game, either statistically or tactically, to suggest that kind of capitulation by Spurs. Brighton are a very good team, and a relentless one, so they’re going to take a bite out of everyone they play. But I think the story of the second half—what best explains the second half—is more to do with Spurs’ capitulation than Brighton’s brilliance.

So I find myself reaching for less tangible—but plausible—explanations.

First, Nathan A. Clark shared some Wyscout data showing that Spurs tend to lose pressing intensity around the same time—the 60th minute or so—every game. This suggests that fatigue is part of the issue. Fatigue is compounded by midweek travel for midweek matches, as well as by the international schedule for many of our players, most notably Romero and Son (the latter obviously not available for the Brighton match).

Fatigue is not just physical—it’s mental as well—which is why it’s probably challenging for, e.g. Romero to keep his head right after going deep into and winning the Copa America, then getting a couple weeks rest before the Premier League season, then getting called straight back into it for his national team, the best national team in the world and under no shortage of pressure. So it’s perhaps not surprising that he’s had some mental lapses recently.

So whereas it’s pretty easy to point to the individual errors that cost Spurs the match in the second half against Brighton, I think such individual errors happened under two very telling explanatory conditions: One is the attenuation of pressing intensity in the second half, probably due to physical fatigue in the squad, a squad that’s notably short in front-line players, i.e. the ones leading the most intense press in the Premier League, maybe in Europe. The other is mental fatigue from a lot of football and a boomerang schedule that has players moving between club and international duty and back again. The players who struggled the most in that second half—Udogie, Romero, van de Ven, Porro—are all playing a lot of football either (or both) domestically and internationally. While others—such as Werner and Solanke—haven’t played enough to be fully match fit.

That’s the best I can do to explain what happened. I’m curious what you think.